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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over Hercules' 
petition for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§34-35-7.1(12), 
63-46b-16(1) and 7 8-2a-3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did The Industrial Commission of Utah ("the 
Commission") correctly apply the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act 
(Title 34, Chapter 35, Utah Code Ann.; "the Act") to Thometz' 
charge of unlawful age discrimination? 
The Court must first determine whether Hercules preserved 
this issue for appellate review by raising the issue before the 
Commission. If Hercules failed to present the issue to the 
Commission, the Court will deem the issue waived. Pease v. 
Industrial Comm.. 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984); Ashcroft v. 
Industrial Commission, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993). 
If Hercules preserved the issue for appellate review, the 
Court will use a "correction of error" standard in judging 
whether the Commission correctly applied the provisions of the 
Act. Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 832 P.2d 1294, 1296 
(Utah 1992); §63-46b-16(4)(d), Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act (Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Ann.; "UAPA" hereafter). 
II. Does substantial evidence support the Commission's 
finding that Hercules discriminated against Thometz on the 
basis of age? 
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The Court will affirm the Commission's determination of 
fact if it is supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record. Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P. 2d 
56, 58 (Utah App. 1992); UAPA §63-46b-16(4)(g). Hercules must 
marshall all evidence supporting the Commission's decision, 
then show that despite such evidence, the Commission's findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence. Grace Drilling v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App. 1989). 
III. Did the Commission err in concluding Thometz had 
mitigated his damages? 
The Commission's determination on the issue of mitigation 
of damages is a factual finding. Ford v. Nicks, 866 F.2d 86f5, 
873 (6th Cir. 1989) . As such, it will be affirmed if supported 
by substantial evidence. Stokes at 58; UAPA §63-46b-16(4)g. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Section 34-35-6 of the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act 
provides: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice: 
(a)(i)for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, 
or to discharge, demote, terminate any person . . . 
otherwise qualified, because of . age, if the 
individual is 40 years of age or older . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Commission accepts Hercules' statement of the nature 
of this case, the course of proceedings and the disposition 
2 
below. The Commission does not accept Hercules' statement of 
facts. Instead, the Commission adopts the statement of facts 
set forth in the brief of co-respondent Thometz. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Hercules argues the Commission erred in adopting the ALJ's 
decision in this matter, because the ALJ's decision 
incorporated an incorrect legal standard in determining whether 
Hercules had discharged Thometz on account of his age. 
However, Hercules failed to raise that issue before the 
Commission and, therefore, failed to preserve the issue for 
appellate review. Furthermore, Hercules is incorrect in its 
premise that the ALJ erred in his application of the Act. 
Hercules also argues that the Commission's finding of 
discrimination is not supported by the evidence. Hercules has 
failed to mar shall the evidence on this issue. When all 
evidence is considered, it is apparent that the Commission's 
decision is supported by substantial evidence.1 
Finally, Hercules contends that Thometz failed to mitigate 
the damages he suffered as a result of Hercules' discrimination 
against him. The Commission properly concluded that Hercules 
failed to prove this affirmative defense. 
1
 The Commission does not independently address this issue, 
but instead adopts the arguments set forth in the brief of co-
r espondent Thome t z. 
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POINT ONE: THE ALJ CORRECTLY APPLIED THE UTAH 
ANTIDISCRIMINATORY ACT TO THOMETZ' CHARGE OF 
UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HERCULES. 
A. HERCULES DID NOT PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW. 
Utah's appellate courts have previously held that, except 
for jurisdictional issues and in other limited circumstances, 
any issue not raised before the Commission is waived and is not 
subject to judicial review. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial 
Comln, 681 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Utah 1984); James v. Preston, et 
al. , 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987); Rekward v. Industrial 
Commln, 755 P.2d 166 (Utah App. 1988). 
UAPA §63-46b-14(2)also requires that issues be presented 
to the Commission before they can be raised on appeal: 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action, except in actions where 
judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after 
exhausting all administrative remedies . . . .2 
The motion for review3 Hercules submitted to the 
Commission raised 12 specific issues. The issue of whether the 
ALJ had correctly applied the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act was 
not among them. 
2
 While UAPA §§63-46b-14(2)(a) and (b) set forth two 
categories of cases where exhaustion of remedies is not required, 
neither category applies to the circumstances of this case. 
3
 Hercules' motion for review was omitted from Hercules' 
own brief. It is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
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As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Pease v. Industrial 
Commission, 694 P.2d at 616: 
In filing the motion for review under §35-1-82.53, 
Mr. Pease had the obligation to raise all the issues 
that could have been presented at that time, and 
those issues not raised were waived. Had he raised 
the issue, either the administrative law judge or 
the Commission could have adjudicated the issues . . 
Thus, Hercules was required to present to the Commission 
all its objections to the ALJ's decision. If Hercules had done 
so, the Commission could have considered and, if necessary, 
corrected the ALJ's error. But Hercules did not challenge the 
ALJ's application of the Antidiscriminatory Act. Consequently, 
Hercules failed to preserve that issue for appellate review. 
B. THE ALJ DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY APPLY THE LAW. 
At page 20 of its brief, Hercules asserts "(t)he agency 
erred, as a matter of law, by concluding that Thometz proved 
his case based solely on a finding that he established a prima 
facie case." (Emphasis added.) 
If the Commission had, in fact, concluded that Thometz 
proved his case solely by establishing a prima facie case, then 
Hercules would be correct in its assignment of error. However, 
a review of the ALJ's decision,4 which was adopted by the 
Commission, reveals that the ALJ correctly identified the 
4
 The ALJ's decision is attached to Hercules' brief as 
Addendum A. 
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requirements of the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act as well as each 
party's respective evidentiary burden under the Act. In doing 
so, the ALJ followed the analysis of the Act's requirements, 
set forth in Sheikh v. Department of Public Safety, 904 P.2d 
1103, 1106 (Utah App. 1995), as follows: 
To establish a claim of employment discrimination, 
the employee has the initial burden to establish a 
prima facie showing of the employer's 
discrimination. Once a prima facie case has been 
established, the burden to produce evidence shifts 
to the employer who must articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory re^ lson for its suspect conduct. 
If the employer succeeds in rebutting the inference 
of discrimination, the burden of production shifts 
back to the employee who must then show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the employer's 
articulated reasons were merely a pretext for 
discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion 
that the employer discriminated against the employee 
remains at all times with the plaintiff. (Internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted.) 
The ALJ applied the foregoing analysis to Thometz' case. 
Beginning at page two of his decision, the ALJ sets forth the 
following analytical framework: 
• Thometz bears the initial burden of establishing a prima 
facie case by proving he was 1) in a protected age group; 
2) adversely affected by Hercules' employment decision; 3) 
qualified for the position at issue; and 4) treated less 
favorably than younger employees. 
• After Thometz establishes a prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to Hercules to articulate a nondiscriminatory 
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reason for its adverse employment action against Thometz. 
• If Hercules articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for its 
actions, Thometz must then present evidence sufficient to 
prove that his age was a determinative factor in his 
separation from employment. 
Having set forth the foregoing analytical pattern, the ALJ 
carefully analyzed the available evidence. It is true that the 
ALJ did not precisely define each stage of his analysis of the 
evidence.5 However, when the ALJ's decision is viewed in its 
entirety and in context, it is apparent that the ALJ concluded 
Thometz had established a prima facie case of discrimination 
and that Hercules had articulated a nondiscriminatory reason 
for its action against Thometz. The ALJ then carefully and 
thoroughly weighed all the evidence in arriving at his ultimate 
conclusion that Thometz had met his ultimate burden of 
persuasion that Hercules had discriminated against Thometz 
because of his age. 
C. SUMMARY. 
By failing to present the issue to the Commission, 
Hercules waived its objection to the ALJ's application of 
Antidiscriminatory Act. Even if Hercules had preserved this 
5
 If Hercules had raised this point in its motion for 
review, the Commission could have corrected any lack of clarity 
in the ALJ's decision. However, as previously discussed, 
Hercules did not present the issue to the Commission. 
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issue for appellate review, the ALJ did not err in his 
application of the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act. 
POINT TWO: SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE 
COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT HERCULES DISCRIMINATED 
AGAINST THOMETZ ON ACCOUNT OF HIS AGE. 
The Commission adopts the arguments set forth in Point II 
of co-respondent Thometz' brief that: 1) Hercules has failed to 
discharge its obligation to marshall the evidence in support of 
the Commission's findings; and that 2) substantial evidence 
supports the Commission's findings. 
POINT THREE: HERCULES FAILED TO PROVE THAT THOMETZ 
DID NOT MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES. 
The Utah Antidiscriminatory Act is interpreted in a manner 
that is consistent with federal antidiscrimination law. Univ. 
of Utah v. Industrial Com'n. 736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1987); Sheikh, 
904 P.2d 1103. Federal appellate courts have held that after 
an employer is found to have unlawfully discriminated against 
an employee, the aggrieved employee is presumptively entitled 
to back pay. Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 F.2d 1515, 
1527 (11th Cir. 1991). Consequently, in light of the 
Commission's finding that Hercules unlawfully discriminated 
against Thometz, Thometz is presumptively entitled to back pay. 
To reduce its liability for back pay, Hercules may attempt 
to prove that Thometz failed to mitigate his damages. Ford 
Motor Co. v. E.E.O.C., 458 U.S. 219, 102 S. Ct. 3057, 73 L.ed.2d 
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721 (1982); Floca v. Homcare Healthservices. Inc. 845 F.2d 
108, 111 (5th Cir . 1988). However, it is Hercules, not 
Thometz, that bears the burden of proof on this issue: 
Because a plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages is 
an affirmative defense, the employer bears the 
burden of proof on this issue. In order to succeed 
on its claim, (the employer) must prove that (the 
employee) was not reasonably diligent in seeking 
other employment, and that with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, there was a reasonable chance 
the employee might have found comparable employment 
Donnelly v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.. 874 F.2d 402, 411 (7th 
Cir. 1989); Sellers v. Delgado Community College, 839 F.2d 
1132, 1138 (5th Cir. 1988). More specifically: 
Once a plaintiff has made out a prima facie 
case of discrimination and has presented evidence on 
damages, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant 
to prove that substantially equivalent employment 
positions were available and that the claimant 
failed to use reasonable diligence in seeking those 
positions. (Citations omitted.) 
Floca v. Homcare Health Services. Inc.. 845 F.2d 108,111 (5th 
Cir. 1988.) 
Other courts have considered the question of what 
constitutes "substantially equivalent" work: 
"Substantially equivalent employment" is employment 
that affords virtually identical promotional 
opportunities, compensation, job responsibilities, 
working conditions, and status to those available to 
employees holding the position from which the Title 
VII claimant has been discriminatorily terminated. 
Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, 922 F.2d at 1527. 
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Because Hercules did not produce any evidence that 
"substantially equivalent employment" was available, Hercules 
failed to prove the first element of the affirmative defense of 
failure to mitigate damages. 
Likewise, Hercules failed to prove that Thometz did not 
use reasonable diligence in seeking other work, which is the 
second element of its affirmative defense. On this point, 
Hercules argues that when Thometz accepted work at Blaine 
Jensen RV Sales ("Jensen"), Thometz "changed occupations". 
Hercules' argument continues that after Thometz changed 
occupations, Hercules has no further liability for back pay. 
Despite its argument, Hercules points to no evidence that 
Thometz intended to "change occupations" by accepting work at 
Jensen. Likewise, there is no evidence that Thometz7 work at 
Jensen detracted from his intention or ability to return to 
work at Hercules, in the event he was permitted to return to 
work. The more reasonable view of Thometz' work at Jensen is 
that it was merely interim work, accepted out of both necessity 
and good faith by Thometz. It does not constitute a new 
occupation, nor does it signify abandonment of his claim to 
employment at Hercules. 
Hercules also suggests that Thometz failed to mitigate his 
damages by quitting his work at Jensen. However, Hercules 
failed to show that such work was substantially equivalent to 
10 
his former employment at Hercules. That Thometz quit 
unsuitable work does not constitute a failure to mitigate 
damages. In Wheeler v. Snvder Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d 1228, 1234 
(7th Cir . 1986), the court stated: 
We agree . . . that the duty to mitigate damages 
does not preclude a plaintiff from quitting a 
position in a different business that pays 
substantially less money. Title VII claimants are 
not obliged to go into another line of work, accept 
a demotion, or take a demeaning position. 
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) 
Hercules does not argue that Thometz' work at Jensen was 
equivalent to his former work at Hercules. Thus, the fact that 
Thometz chose to quit that work does not foreclose his right to 
receive back pay from Hercules. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to Hercules' first argument, the ALJ correctly 
applied the provisions of the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act to 
Thometz' claim against Hercules. Furthermore, Hercules waived 
its right to appellate review on that issue by failing to 
present it to the Industrial Commission. 
Regarding Hercules' challenge to the Commission's finding 
that Hercules discriminated against Thometz on account of age, 
Hercules did not discharge its obligation to marshall all the 
evidence in support of the Commission's finding. When all such 
evidence is considered, it constitutes substantial evidence in 
support of the Commission's decision. 
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Finally, Hercules did not prove its affirmative defense 
that Thometz failed to mitigate his damages. Not only did 
Hercules fail to establish that suitable work was available to 
Thometz, but it also failed to show that Thometz did not take 
reasonably diligent action to obtain such work. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Industrial Commission 
respectfully asks the Utah Court of Appeals to affirm the 
Commission's decision in this matter and to dismiss Hercules' 
petition for review. 
Dated this 20th day of May, 1996. 
/-^  A— i^  •—u-AJ\ 
Alan Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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EXHIBIT A 
Brent H. Shimada 
Attorney for: 
Hercules Incorporated 
P.O. Box 98 
Magna, Utah 84044-0098 
DECEIVED 
APR 1 2 1995 
^CRIMINATION DIVISION 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
LOEL D. THOMETZ, 
Charging Party 
VS. 
HERCULES INCORPORATED, 
Respondent 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 8930254 
Pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R660-1-4A.5 and U.C.A, Section 63-
46b-12(l), Respondent Hercules Incorporated, through its undersigned counsel, 
hereby moves the Industrial Commission of Utah for review of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order ("Order") entered in this matter by Benjamin A. Sims, 
Administrative Law Judge, on March 13,1995 (A copy of the Order is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A). 
In support of this motion, Hercules points to the following objections and 
errors: 
1. The statistical analysis included in the Order is misleading. The 
statistical analysis contained in the Order calculates the "percentage of workers for 
EXHIBIT 1 M i * / * * * . 
a particular age group from the total workers for the same age group who were 
RIFed." Order at 5. Based upon this calculation, it is determined that the 
percentage of RIFed employees between 55-64 years old1 is "1.4 times the percentage 
of the next highest RIFed age group (25-29), and 3.5 times the percentage of the 
lowest RIFed age group (45-49)." Id,. As noted in footnote 1 herein, this calculation 
is incorrect. In addition, this grouping and calculation is misleading, especially in the 
age 60-64 age range, because the populations are too small to have statistical validity. 
Hercules submits that the statistical analysis submitted through 
testimony at the formal hearing is proper and demonstrates that there is no 
statistically significant difference between those employees who were under 40 years 
of age and those 40 years of age and older. 
Furthermore, assuming for purposes of this motion that the Order's 
grouping is more appropriate, i.e,. that the population of employees between ages 50-
69 is a more valid analysis, Hercules submits that the statistical analysis 
demonstrates that there was no adverse impact to this age classification. If a 
comparison is made between the total plant population with the RIF population for 
these age groupings, the percentages come out equal. In other words, there were 535 
employees between the ages of 50-69 and 23 of those employees were RIFed, or 4%. 
The calculation that the RIFed employees between the ages of 55-64 
equates to seven percent of the total workers in that age group is 
incorrect. The correct quotient is five percent (14 RIFed 
employees/273 employees s 5%). Consequently, contrary to the Order, 
the percent of employees RIFed in the 55-64 age category is equivalent 
to the percent RIFed in the 25-29 age category and 2.5 times the 
percent RIFed in the 45-49 age category. 
-2-
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Likewise, there were 1653 employees between the ages of 20-49 with 61 of those 
employees EIFed, or 4%. Another way to look at this data is that out of 2188 total 
employees, there were 535 employees between the ages of 50-69 (or 24%) and 1653 
employees between the ages of 20-49 (or 76%). Of the total RIF popi^ lation of 84 
employees, 23 (or 27%) were between the ages of 50-69 and 61 (or 73%) were between 
the ages of 20-49. 
Rather than support a finding of age discrimination, Hercules submits 
that the statistical data and corresponding analysis does just the opposite. 
2. Hercules submits that other than Charging Party's testimony, there is 
no other support for any finding that Charging Party's supervisor (Lisa Hughes) 
made the statements "let the younger guys' do the work" (Id at 6) or that his 
"coworkers referred to him as 'old man' or 'grandpa'" (Id.) Ms. Hughes testified that 
she had no recollection of such statements being made and that Charging Party never 
brought those matters to her attention. Apparently, if those comments were made, 
Charging Party was not concerned or offended by those remarks to bring them to the 
attention of his supervisor so that she could put an end to the alleged comments. The 
credibility of this testimony must be questioned. 
Even assuming that the comments 'let the younger guys do the work" 
were made, the finding that these comments provided some evidence of how Ms. 
Hughes viewed Charging Party (See Id.) is improper. The Order finds that "this 
remark was made after the CP had returned to work subsequent to being off work 
for cancer treatment, and during a discussion with Ms. Hughes in which the CP had 
-3-
FYTTTOTT 1 
complained of the burden of lifting various heavy items during the inspection 
process." IcL It is undisputed that Charging Party was the eldest employee in the; 
department, consequently, any reference to assistance for the Charging Party from 
anyone in the department would have been a reference to a "youngei" employee. 
There is no basis to conclude that any such alleged comment by Ms, Hughes was 
anything other than a normal conversational response to Charging Party's request 
for help. It certainly bears no weight to the issue of discrimination given the 
testimony on the record. 
3. The comments attributed to Charging Party's coworkers and supervisor 
are "stray" remarks and are insufficient to support a finding of discrimination. 
Again, the only evidence presented regarding the comments from Charging Party's 
coworkers and supervisor, Ms. Hughes, is the testimony of Charging Party. Ms. 
Hughes, who was supposedly present at the times the coworkers made the comments 
about "grandpa" and "old man" did not recall that such statements were made nor 
that Charging Party brought those comments to her attention. Assuming, arguendo, 
that such statements were made, such comments were not made by a RIF decision 
maker and were not related to the RIP process. They are clearly "stray" comments 
which do not show discriminatory intent or pretext. See Rea v. Martin Marietta 
Corporation, 29 F.3d 1450 at 1457 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Isolated comments unrelated 
to the challenged action, are insufficient to show discriminatory animus in 
termination decisions'" Cone, 14 F.3d at 531.) 
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4. The Order also finds that: 
The CP's supervisor placed the applicant on the RTF list 
without reviewing the performance records or talking to 
the individuals concerned. There was no Hercules' policy 
that the performance records be reviewed or that the 
individuals be consulted. However, this action indicates a 
great reliance on the information which she carried with 
her including her understanding of the CFs capabilities 
and of his value to Hercules. It was apparent that she on 
several previous occasions had felt that younger people 
should do portions of the CFs job. 
Order at 6-7. While it is true that Charging Party's supervisor, Ms. Hughes did not 
review his performance records nor talk to Charging Party or his coworkers when 
making the RTF list, there is absolutely no evidence on the record that Ms. Hughes 
placed greater value upon younger employees or that younger employees should do 
part of Charging Party's job. It is undisputed that Charging Party was transferred 
over into Ms. Hughes' department primarily to work on the MCS program, that 
during his tenure in Ms. Hughes' department his primary task was to work the MCS 
program, that at the time of the RTF he had very limited experience on other 
programs in that department, that at the time of the RTF Charging Party had the 
least amount of time in Ms. Hughes' organization, and that the MCS program was 
indeed terminated shortly after Charging Party's RIF. Given this information, there 
is ample evidence to support Ms. Hughes independent determination that Charging 
Party was the least valuable employee to her department when compared to the other 
employees. 
5. The Order next finds that notations on the Policy Compliance Committee 
(PCC) members' notes reflect the age, sex and race/national origin of the employees 
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being considered and concludes that, "[t]here is really no reason to consider the age, 
race, gender, national origin or other impermissible factor when a perscn 13 
determined to be eligible for a BIF based upon performance characteristics. Writing 
down such characteristics tends to bolster the view that improper facsors were being 
considered" See Id. at 8. There is no evidence to support this finding and therefore 
must be disregarded. The fact that the notations exist, without more, do not support 
a finding that improper considerations were made. An explanation for such notations 
that is just as credible is that the PCC wanted to assure itself that minorities, 
females and older aged employees were not being adversely affected by the ranking 
process and that it did not appear that there was a bias in the ranking being 
provided by the specific department management under scrutiny. 
6. The Order's reliance on the fact that Charging Party worked in the 
"closed" area of a facility to support the finding that Charging Party had more varied 
experience is misplaced. See Id. at 9-10. The testimony does not support the finding 
that the "closed" area required a higher degree of skill or technical competence. 
Bather the evidence is that the "closed" is simply a designation for the security 
clearance required to work in the area and not the technical nature of the projects 
being worked on. The evidence indicates that assigning employees to work the 
"closed" or "open" areas is simply a decision by management, assuming that the 
employee has the necessary security clearance to work on the "closed" side. Whether 
an employee has the security clearance to work on the "closed" side is also irrelevant 
to the case at hand since no such security clearance was required to work in the 
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department from which Charging Party was RIFed. 
7. The Order finds that, "Mr, Nuttal related that in bis view, the C? should 
have been placed on the bottom of the list because Mr, Garcia 'was a communicator 
and could pull people together/ However, there was testimony given by others that 
the CP was able to deal with others, and was a facilitator," See Id. at 9, The 
testimony which the Order relies upon is the testimony by two ex-employees who had 
no direct supervisor relationship over Charging Party, and more importantly, had 
little to no exposure to the capabilities of Mr. Garcia. This testimony is further 
biased in favor of Charging Party since one witness (Mr. Walker) is a close friend of 
Charging Party and the other witness (Mr. Vilart) was also RIFed from Hercules and 
subsequently filed a charge of discrimination against Hercules. This testimony must 
be given very little weight when compared to the testimony of Mr. Nuttal who was 
the direct supervisor of Charging Party, concurred with the ranking of Charging 
Party, and was himself 59 years old at the time of Charging Party's termination. 
8. Ms. Hughes and Mr. Nuttal testified that Charging Party was the least 
valuable to their department since he had a short tenure in the department, had 
limited exposure to other programs in that department and was essentially dedicated 
to a program that was ending, whereas the remaining employees had considerably 
more time in the department and were able to perform the duties on all the other 
programs. The finding that, "[t]he evidence tends to show that based upon the CP's 
work history he was capable of performing more varied types of duties than was Mr. 
Garcia" (Order at 10.) is unfounded and irrelevant. The evidence is clear that the 
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decision to rank Charging Party last was based upon his value to the department at 
that time and not what he was capable of doing if given enough amount of erne. This 
ranking decision is not improper, does not show age animus, and is in compliance 
with the Hercules reduction in force policy. See Res. Ex. 5, at Bate Stamp No. 
000446, d x . ("Potential is never a factor in these displacement decisions.")2 By 
giving weight to Charging Party's work history to conclude that Charging Party was 
capable of performing more varied duties than Mr. Garcia, the Order improperly 
substitutes its business judgment for that of Hercules. 
9. There was no apparent consideration given to the fact that Charging 
Party was hired at the age of 46, well within the protected class. 
10. There was little consideration given to Mr. NuttaTs concurrence that 
Charging Party was properly ranked below Mr. Garcia and that Charging Party 
testified that he had no reason to believe that Mr. Nuttal would or did discriminate 
against him because of his age. 
11. There was no apparent consideration given to evidence submitted 
comparing the Performance Appraisal Reviews (PARs) of Charging Party against 
other coworkers, especially Mr. Garcia; such evidence demonstrating that Mr. Garcia 
and the other workers were superior performers to Charging Party. There was also 
no apparent consideration given to Mr. NuttaTs testimony that he would have given 
Charging Party an overall rating of MC-" had he had the opportunity to give Charging 
Party a PAR. 
2
 Res. Ex. 5 is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
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12, There was no apparent consideration given to Charging Party's failure 
to mitigate damages. Charging Party testified that he di*3 not begin seeking 
employment from companies which he identified until approximately August 1994. 
Based upon the foregoing, Hercules request the that the findings of fact 
and conclusions be corrected to be consistent with the discussion herein. Hercules 
further requests that the Summary of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
be corrected; specifically, that numbers 4,7,8,9 and 10 are stricken and that number 
6 is modified to read, "Number 4 was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence 
discussed above." Furthermore, Hercules requests that the Order be modified to 
dismiss the matter. In the alternative, Hercules requests that the Order recognize 
that Charging Party feiled to mitigate his damages until August 1994 and that the 
Order be modified accordingly. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this / / W d a v of April, 1995. 
Attorney for Hercules Incorporated 
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EXHIBIT A 
EXHIBIT! 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No, 8930254 
LOEL D. THOMETZ, 
Charging Party, 
vs. 
HERCULES INCORPORATED, 
Respondent. 
* 
* 
* 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on October 
26, 1994 at 8:30 o'clock a.m. The hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge. 
The charging party, was present and was represented 
by Kenneth B. Grimes, Jr., Attorney at Law. 
The Respondent employer, Hercules Incorporated, was 
represented by Brent H. Shimada, Attorney at Law. 
This matter was continued from October 12, 19 94, at the 
request of the charging party's (CP) counsel. At the conclusion of 
the evidentiary hearing held on October 26, 1994, each of the 
parties was given until November 15, 1994 to provide written 
closing statements. The statements were submitted on that date, 
and on November 16, 1994, the case was considered ready for an 
order by the administrative law judge. 
The applicable law in this case is the Antidiscrimination Act 
which is found at U.C.A. Section 34-35-1 et seq. (1969 as amended). 
U.C.A. Section 34-35-6 (1989) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice: 
(a) (i) for an employer to ... discharge, . . . 
terminate any person, . . . or discriminate in 
terms, priviletes, and conditions of employment 
against any person otherwise qualified, because of 
... age, if the individual is 40 years of age or ol-
der. . . . 
* * * 
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(4) .•. [E]xcept where age is a bona fide occupational 
qualification, no person shall be subject to involun-
tary termination ... from employment on the basis of 
age alone, if the individual is 4 0 years of,.age or ol-
der. 
In order to prevail in a claim of age discrimination, an 
employee must establish by a preponderance of evidence that his age 
was a determining factor in subjecting him to an adverse employment 
action. Except for Paragraph (4) noted above, an employee is not 
required to prove that his age was the sole motive for the 
employment action, only that the employment action would not have 
occurred, but for the employee's age. Texas Dept. of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 250 US 248, 256 (1981). 
Age discrimination may be established either by direct 
evidence of discriminatory motive, or other circumstantial evidence 
that the employer's stated motive is a pretext for discrimination, 
or through a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. 
E.E.O.C. v. Flasher Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 
1992). 
The respondent, Hercules, Inc. (Hercules), has undergone a 
number of reductions in force which were necessitated by the 
drastic economic downturn of the aerospace and defense industries. 
Since October 1990, the Hercules' Bacchus Works, the facility at 
issue in this case, has reduced its workforce by approximately 
1,800 employees. The CP was laid off in August 1992 as a result of 
one of those reductions in force. Faced with a significantly 
declining business base, Hercules had no choice, but to reduce the 
size of its work force. Rather than do this randomly, Hercules 
designed and implemented an extensive lay-off system which it 
claims maintained the skills it needed without discriminating 
against any protected class of employees. 
In the case of Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp. , 29 F.3d 1450 
(10th Cir. 1994)(Rea), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated 
that to prove a prima facia case of age discrimination in a 
reduction in force context, the charging party must show: 1. That 
he was in the protected age group; 2. that he was adversely 
affected by the employment decision; 3. that he was qualified for 
the position at issue; and, 4. that he was treated less favorably 
than younger employees during the reduction in force. Once the CP 
establishes a prima facie case, "the burden shifts [to the 
respondent] to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
the adverse employment decision." Rea, at 1454. 
The respondent's burden to show a legitimate nondiscrimination 
reason is not very great. The respondent can satisfy its burden 
merely by raising a genuine issue "of fact as to whether it 
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discriminated against the plaintiff. Rea, at 1454-1455. See 
Faulkner v. Super Value Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1425 (10th Cir. 
1993) (Faulkner) . After the respondent provides nondiscriminatory 
reasons for its action, the CP must then present, "specific facts 
significantly probative to support an inference that [respondent's] 
proffered justifications were a pretext for discrimination." 
Faulkner, at 14 25. In other words, "the [CP] must show that age 
actually played a role in the [respondent's] decision making 
process and was a determinatives influence in the outcome." Id. 
Hercules concedes that the CP satisfied the first three 
elements of the prime facie case of age discrimination. These 
elements were that the CP: was in the protected age group, was 
qualified, and was adversely affected by the reduction in force 
, (RIF). This opinion will not, therefore, discuss those issues in 
any detail. Hercules contends that the CP cannot satisfy the 
fourth element because the evidence does not show that he was 
treated less favorably than younger employees during the RIF's. 
The CP's education, work, and personal history will be 
reviewed. He attended Everett Junior College for 2 1/2 years 
study±ng engineering and mechanical machining. He also attended 
the Seattle Police Academy where he trained in criminal and arson 
investigations. He is a certified arson investigator. 
From September 1958 until August 1962, the CP worked for 
Boeing Aircraft Company as a: tool and pattern maker, plaster and 
plastic pattern maker, lead man in the pattern shop, inspector, 
and job coordinator. From August 19 62 to February 19 65, the CP 
worked for Western Gear Corporation as an assemblyman, a machinist 
apprentice, and in physical and chemical testing. From February 
1965 to May 1968, he worked for Everett Machine and Fabrication 
managing a machine shop and steel fabrication company. He prepared 
bids, set up procedures, operated lathes, mills, planers, surface 
grinders, did inspections, and set up metal fabrication gigs. 
From May 1968 to April 1979, the CP worked for the City of 
Everett Fire Department. He acted as a fire fighter and marshal as 
well as senior inspector and arson investigator. From April 198 0 
to February 1982, he worked for Beehive Machinery as the manager of 
the quality assurance department, and as an inspector. From 
February 1982 to January 1984, he was semiretired. From January 
1984 to May 1984, he was the head of the quality control department 
and inspector for M & D, Inc, 
From May 1984 to August 1992, he worked for Hercules in 
quality assurance, quality control, inspecting end items, 
inspecting received items, and all types of hands on inspections, 
physical testing, document preparation, input and retrievable 
information, coordinating with manufacturing, engineering, customer 
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service, and training of new quality assurance engineers in 
document preparation for the material review board. 
He was one of those selected by his supervisor to be 
terminated in a reduction in force in August 1992. The list of all 
quality assurance nonexempt employees in Department 7 600 in August 
1992 shows that the CP was the oldest, and that Jose L. Garcia, the 
next to be RIF'ed after the CP, was the next oldest. In terms of 
service with Hercules, Shirley D. Randazzo had the least amount, 
and the CP had the second least amount. Ms. Randazzo was one month 
junior to the CP in service. Jose L. Garcia was number three in 
terms of seniority. However, the CP, as well as the other 
mentioned, were salaried employees, and Hercules did not have a 
seniority based system for salaried personnel. There was no 
^evidence that the number of years with Hercules was a factor in 
determining retention. 
With regard to RIF's during the period of the CP's 
termination, the evidence shows that the following numbers were 
RIF/ed from the Hercules Baccus facility during 1991 - 1992. The 
following table was constructed from Hercules/ data supplied to the 
IC, and reflects the number RIF'ed (top number) in comparison with 
the number who were aged 4 0 and over (bottom number) . It must be 
noted that the data supplied from Hercules was for the entire 
facility, and does not reflect the narrow subgroup of the composite 
structures group. Nevertheless, the Hercules' data will be 
studied: 
12/31/91 3/31/92 6/30/92 9/30/92 12/31/92 
RIF'd 157 113 35 84 105 
40 & Up 84 56 14 39 58 
The following table shows the number of workers RIF'ed who are 
50 and over (classified by the Social Security Administration as 
being of advanced age, and approaching advanced age), and those who 
are 18 - 49 (younger workers) . See 20 CFR Ch. Ill, Pt. 404, Subpt. 
P, App 2, 201.00(f) , (g) , and (h) (1993) . When the data is reviewed 
using the Social Security Administration classifications, the table 
looks somewhat different than the table above. 
12/31/91 3/31/92 6/30/92 9/30/92 12/31/92 
RIF'd 157 113 35 84 105 
20-49 109 * 86 31 61 71 
50-69 48 17 4 23 34 
It would seem more appropriate to use this breakdown since the 
applicant was in the 55-59 age group",- and presumably discrimination 
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would be more likely to occur the older a worker" becomes. This 
analysis would place the worker into a group aged 50 - 69 which is 
more related to his age than to the group aged 4 0 - 69. The 
numbers and percentages of individuals of the ages shown in the 
following table were RIF'd during the September 30, 19 9 2 reduction. 
The percentages shown are the percentage of workers for a 
particular age group from the total workers for the same age group 
who were RIF'ed. 
Number Percentage 
2 0 - 2 4 0 0 
2 5 - 2 9 8 5 
30 - 34 17 4 
35 - 39 20 4 
40 - 44 12 4 
4 5 - 4 9 4 2 
5 0 - 5 4 9 3 
55 - 59 11 5 
6 0 - 6 4 3 9 
It should be noted that the percentages were rounded up or 
down, as appropriate, and the total may therefore add to a 
different percentage than the actual overall percentage. Hercules 
stated that it found that there was no statistical evidence that 
there was any age group which was unfairly represented in its RIF. 
It might' be argued that the 60 - 64 year old age is represented at 
about twice to almost three times the percentages of the other 
groups. Three individuals were RIF'ed out of 32. 
When the 55 - 59 age group is added to the 6 0 - 6 4 age group, 
the percentages show that the RIF'ed number of 55 - 64 year olds 
consisted of approximately seven per cent which is more than 1.4 
times the percentage of the next highest RIF'ed age group (25 -
29), and 3.5 times the percentage of the lowest RIF'ed age group 
(45 - 49). Although the caution flag is raised, these statistics 
do not show that the Hercules Bacchus Facility discriminated 
against the CP. However, they do show that a significantly higher 
percentage of workers were RIF'ed in the 55 - 64 year old age group 
than were RIF'ed in the younger age groups. Nevertheless, because 
of the status of the basic data, the evidence mustered by the CP 
will be reviewed to determine whether the specific proof is 
sufficient to make out a case of age discrimination, and in the 
course of the review, the data set forth by Hercules to explain its 
actions will be viewed more carefully because of the statistics. 
The personnel displacement list shows how the supervisor 
ranked her employees for RIF. The list shows that the two oldest 
employees were to be RIF'ed. The CP was the first to be RIF'ed. 
He was 55 years old at the time that he was placed on this list. 
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The next employee to be RIF'ed was Garcia win* w.w. aqp II , il I In 
time of his placement. 
Out of the remaining four employees, their ages ranged from 40 
- 3 1 years• The order of removal of these employees after the CP 
and Garcia would be: Robert Fellows - age 31; Dalton Driggers -
age 33; Shirley Randazzo - age 40; and Steven Done - age 34. The 
average age of the remaining employees would have been reduced to 
34,5 years if the CP and Garcia were removed. If only the CP were. 
removed, the average age would have been dimi nished to 3 6.4 years. 
Ti le CP argues that his claim of age discrimination is 
supported by both direct and circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory motive on the part of Hercules, He urges that 
within a few months prior to his selection for RIF, his supervisor, 
Lisa Hughes made a statement on two occassions that he should "let 
the younger guys11 do his work. The evidence shows that this remark 
was made after the CP had returned to work subsequent to being off 
work for cancer treatment, and during a discussion with Ms. Hughes 
in which the CP had complained of the burden of lifting various 
.heavy items during the inspection process. 
Ms. Hughes testified that she made this statement out of 
concern for the CP, and out of concern for his safety. There can 
certainly be no argument against her intent in this instance. 
However, it is at least apparent that the statement impliedly 
reflects Ms. Hughes belief that the "younger guys" should do the 
work because they were capable of doing the lifting and other 
requirements. Assuming rationality and intent behind all 
expressions uttered unless the context shows otherwise, if Ms. 
Hughes did not mean to say "younger," she would not have done so. 
.iw hearings and trials, words stated often are dissected for 
meaning that may have been motivated by the unconscious or 
conscious brain at the time of verbalization. The statement "let 
the younger guys" do the work, while benevolent, is anathema in the 
discrimination contexts and while not dispositive of this case is 
some evidence as to how the CP was viewed by Ms. Hughes at least on 
the day and time of utterance. 
The CP also testified that several of the CP's coworkers 
referred to him as "old man" and "grandpa." He further testified 
that such statements were made in the presence of Ms. Hughes, and 
that she took no action with respect to these statements, Ms. 
Hughes testified that she does not recall these statements being 
made. The evidence of his coworker's statements will be given 
li ttl e weight ir the overall analys.ir. 
The CP's ::uper\ roi yi.i^tjo : h,
 :; pi . int on the RIF Ji t-.it 
withou t: reviewing T;- - ortormanco records o> talking to the 
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individuals concerned. There was no Hercules' policy that the 
performance records be reviewed or that the individuals be 
consulted. However, this action indicates a great reliance on the 
information which she carried with her including her understanding 
of the CP's capabilities and of his value to Hercules. It was 
apparent that she on several previous occassions had felt that 
younger people should do portions of the CP's job. 
The CP next argues that there is additional direct evidence of 
age discrimination shown by the notes made by the Policy Compliance 
Committee (PCC). The PCC was designed by Hercules to review the 
individuals selected for RIF to insure nondiscriminatory compliance 
with the Hercules' RIF plan. As evidenced by the PCC policy 
(Respondent's Exh. 5), and the testimony of Mr. John D. Bailey, 
•director of human resources for Composite Structures, the process 
entailed first ranking all employees by performance, and next 
selecting the lowest ranked employees for layoff. Then, the 
rankings and layoff recommendations were presented to an internal 
review committee. The policy committee was to review the 
recommendations to be sure that they were supported by job 
performance, and were not impacted in any manner by discriminatory 
motives* 
The evidence shows that the PCC committee was to assure that 
the "specific practices and procedures used to identify and select 
persons for separation are in compliance with [Hercules'] policies 
and all applicable laws and regulations (including, but not limited 
to; EEO, ADEA, ERISA, COBRA, etc.)." Respondent's Exh. at 443. In 
addition, the following four objectives were to be considered by 
the CP's supervisor to select those employees to be RIF'ed: 
a. Maintain the best workforce, upgrading where 
possible; 
b. Avoid any discriminatory actions in regard to race, 
sex, age, pension discrimination, etc.; 
c. Minimize geographic relocations between facilities, 
offices and plants; and, 
d. Restrict training and/or retraining to 
familiarization/orientation of displaces personnel proposed for 
reassignment to a different position. 
Id. 
No action could be taken to displace or to separate the CP 
without the prior approval of the PCC. The PCC met to review the 
proposed action of the CP's supervisor, and discussed the 
supervisor's list of potential RIF-'s with her. There was little 
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testimony as to what the PCC actually discussed since the witnesses 
could not remember much about the consideration of applicant by the 
PCC or the presentation made by the applicant's supervisor before 
the PCC. The testimony by Hercules' witnesses noted the goal of 
the PCC to prevent discrimination against parties in protected 
classes, and they testified that they were sure that the PCC did i n 
fact do that. 
The notes of the PCC reflect that .one member of the PCC noted 
that Mr. Garcia was hispanic (respondent's exh. at 313); another 
reports that Randazzo, Driggers, Garcia, and Thometz were 
"similar," but that Driggers was an outstanding performer 
(respondent's exh. it 314); another reported that Garcia was 
hispanic, but also circled the ages, of Randazzo, Garcia, and 
Thometz who were the oldest three employees on this list. The 
explanation given by Hercules as to why some of the PCC wrote 
information about protected categories was that this was the reason 
for the existence of the PCC; that is,, the PCC was to ensure that 
illegal considerations had not resulted in the placement of 
employees on the RIF lists. However, no member " of the PCC 
testified as to what he or she meant by the notations. The CP 
argues that these notations are per se discriminatory because they 
show that age and other illegal characteristics were considered by 
the PCC. 
Hercules argues that the PCC had to consider what would 
normally be impermissible factors such as age, race, gender in 
order to protect the employee's civil rights. There was no 
evidence to show that the PCC had a beneficial effect on protecting 
any employee's rights. This is not to say that 11 did not protect 
such rights, only that such protection would have to be implied 
because there was no evidence that the PCC ever found that any 
employee was placed on the list i i i violation of guidelines. 
Perhaps all of the supervisors were well trained, and did not 
ever consider impermissible characteristics in violation of 
discrimination law. On the other hand, when some of the individual 
members noted the protected categories of the various individuals 
on the RIF lists, there was at least an inference that the 
characteristics were being improperly considered especially when 
there was testimony that nine out of 15 employees of the composite 
structures selected for RIF at the time that the CP was selected 
were over 50. At the best, there was no di rect evidence that the 
notes were made to protect the workers. 
There is really no reason to consider the age, race, gender, 
national origin or other impermissible factors when a person is 
determined to be eligible for a RIF based upon performance 
characteristics. Writing down such characteristics tends to 
bolster the view that improper factors were being considered. 
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Value to Hercules was the professed criterium which Hercules claims 
was the most important attribute. That should have been the factor 
which was preeminent in the minds of the PCC and the supervisor. 
There is at least some evidence that other illegal factors were 
considered, and although Hercules may argue that the PCC did the 
antidiscrimination job for which it was created, there was little 
evidence that the PCC acted as the Hercules' Reduction in Force 
Policy stated that it would. Respondent's Exh. At 442. 
The supervisor says that she placed the CP on the bottom of 
the list because he was the least valuable to Hercules. Although 
Hercules claimed that age was not a permissible factor for a 
supervisor to consider except to use to retain the oldest employee 
where a tie existed in a value comparison, there is often little 
direct evidence that age is a factor in placing someone on the RIF 
list in age discrimination cases. 
Ms. Lisa Hughes, the supervisor, started work for Hercules in 
May 1985 as a reliability engineer in the Aerospace Propulsion 
Division. She was a quality engineer from 1986 until March 1988. 
From 1988 to 1992, she described herself as a "pseudo manager= " 
She is currently the quality safety manager for the Specialty 
Structures Division. 
In November 1991, the CP was transferred to her department in 
the MCS program because of the needs of Hercules. She states that 
she believed that the CP could do floor inspections, and did not 
consider whether he could do other tasks. She claims that she 
interacted with the CP daily. 
Sometime after April 1992, she was told to rank her employees 
for a possible RIF. She did so. Respondent's Exh. 3. She 
realised in June 1992 that there would be a RIF. She discussed the 
RIF with her subordinate Mr. Nuttal. There was much discussion in 
the testimony about the relative merits and performance ratings of 
the CP and compared to Mr. Garcia. There was evidence presented 
that the CP was generally regarded as being a more valuable 
employee than Mr. Garcia because of his more varied experience, and 
because of his working in the "closed" section (working on security 
classified materials) more than Mr. Garcia. It is noted, however, 
that both he and Mr. Garcia were placed at the bottom, and next to 
the bottom of the list, respectively. 
Mr. Nuttal related that in his view, the CP should-have been 
placed on the bottom of the list because Mr. Garcia "was a 
communicator and could pull people together." However, there was 
testimony given by others that the CP was able to deal with others, 
and was a facilitator. Apparently,. Ms. Hughes conveyed her list to 
Mr. Nuttal, and he agreed that the CP was properly on the bottom of 
the list. Mr. Nuttal had spent only several months with the CP. 
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Mr, Nuttal had no independent authority to construct vhe list, and 
the list was the product of Ms. Hughes' thought processes, and her 
understanding of the CP's strengths and weaknesses. 
Although there was little difference between the performance 
ratings of Garcia and the CP, and which are proximate to the the 
RIF date, the CP had more varied experience while working in the 
field. He had spent a good deal of time in the "closed" area which 
consisted of a variety of work in security intensive areas, Mr. 
Garcia had spent most of his time in the "Boeing Springs" area, 
although the CP had also performed some work in this function. The 
evidence tends to show that based upon the CP's work history he was 
capable of performing more varied types of duties than was Mr. 
Garcia. The supervisor says that she was not aware of the CP's 
performance in other divisions, and admits that she did not seek to 
find out the nature of his performance. She was primarily aware of 
his performance in her operation, and she felt that his value to 
Hercules was the least of anyone who worked for her. 
Ms. Hughes had only a few months more than Mr. Nuttal to work 
with the CP. The evidence shows generally that with the exception 
of the supervisor, and Mr. Nuttal, at least three individuals 
testified that the CP was a superior employee to Mr. Garcia. Mr. 
Bradford testified that the CP had a breadth of experience and 
ability. Mr. Walker testified that the CP had performed all of the 
various quality inspection functions on various projects during the 
time that the CP worked in Composite Structures. Although the 
supervisor - denies knowing that the CP worked in all of these 
capacities, it is difficult to understand how she could be unaware 
of this. The conclusion is inescapable that the supervisor felt, 
either consciously or unconsciously, that the CP/s age, and perhaps 
other factors such as his health, were significant considerations 
which when weighed with his job performance dictated that he be 
relegated to the bottom of tho ilst. 
The CP did not raise the health issue as one of disability, 
and this issue hn •- w t been considered • •• v.-.h Ln 3 a decision on 
this case. 
DAMAGES: 
.•v^ -ro ; cai-L cr age discrimination is proved undpr ut.-ih l.u-,, •  
the t/• /1 r.iss 1 cn : 1: authorized to: 
[Ijssue an order requiring the respondent to cease 
any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice 
and to provide relief to the complaining party, in-
cluding reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and 
attorneys/ fees and costs. 
EXHIBIT! 
HERCULES INCORPORATED, 
Respondent 
EXHIBIT 5 
In the matter of 
Thometz v. Hercules Incorporated 
Case No. 8930254 
EXHIBIT 1 
LOEL D. THOMETZ 
ORDER 
PAGE ELEVEN 
U..C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) ( L9(J 1) 
With regard to back pay and benefits, the CP showed chat at 
the time of his layoff on August 31, 1992 he was earning- $2, 411 per 
month. He was given severance pay of $9,64 4 to December 31, 19 92; 
and he is considered to have been compensated for the period from 
August 31, 19 9 2 through December 31, 19 9 2. 
He showed that i lis lost wages from January 1, 19 9 3 to October 
26, 1994 would have been $53,042. He did not include any raises 
during this period which might have been given by the employer. 
The evidence shows that he earned i ncome of $19,734. M lioin 
Blaine Jensen R.V. Sales subsequent to . hi s termination. This 
* amount must be deducted from the lost wages which he claims. The 
resulting amount of lost wages minus the earned income from Blaine 
Jensen is $33,307.66, 
""The CP claims ten percent interest which the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Division awarded him. There is no provision of 
the Antidiscrimination Act which allows a. ten percent interest 
award, and the CP has not indicated any law upon which the 
Commission can rely to impose this interest award. Under the 
circumstances, the i nterest cannot be imposed. 
With regard to the claimed loss of $1,871.93 from the CP's 
investment and savings plan, the evidence is insufficient to show 
the terms of the plan, and the Commission is unable to calculate 
damages based upon the presentation. The stated loss of stock 
value of 151 1/2 shares of Herculesf stock coupled with the claim 
by- the CP that he lost "approximately two shares per month11 (44 
shares) at $101.25 as of October 1994 is likewise speculative, and 
the testimony did not show any detail of the CP's participation in 
the plan, nor did it show in a reasonable manner how the damages 
were calculated. 
The Commission is unaware of the terms of the stock plan, and 
in addition, it would seem reasonable to calculate damages based 
upon the difference between the purchase price minus the sale price 
or fair market value at the time of hearing. The testimony was not 
clear, and the evidence did not show how the damages were 
calculated. The damages claimed for stock loss amounted to $4,455 
for 44 shares at $101.25 per share. The c] aim of $4,455 i s the 
entire value of 44 shares at $101.25, and in order to claim this 
amount, it would be necessary for the two shares to be given to the 
employee without cost each month. This is inconsistent with the 
claim that the shares were purchased at a reduced cost, In 
addition, there is no showing that the wages from which the shares 
would have been purchased were reduced by the amount of the 
purchase. Failure to do this won] d have created a duplication ii i 
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the amount of loss claimed for wages, and in the purchase of the 
shares. Under the circumstances, the Commission is unable to 
ferret out the facts as to the amount of the stock loss. 
After carefully considering the amount of damages, it is found 
that the amount of damages which have been proved is $33,307.66. 
ATTORNEYS' FEES: 
Kenneth B. Grimes, Jr. is the attorney of record for the CP in 
this case. Attorneys' fees are authorized to a prevailing party 
under U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) (1991). He has billed his 
services at $100 per hour. This rate is within the prevailing rate 
for attorneys in the Salt Lake City area. Mr. Grimes has provided 
a detailed listing of the services rendered, and the hours worked. 
He shows that he worked on this case for 93.45 hours. He claims 
total fees of $9,345. This amount is reasonable for the services 
provided, and will be approved. 
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. The charging party, Loel D. Thometz, was in the protected 
age group at the time of his termination from Hercules. 
2. He was adversely affected by a termination from 
employment. 
3. He was qualified for his position. 
4. He was treated less favorably than younger employees. 
5. Numbers 1, 2, and 3 were conceded by the employer. 
6. Number 4 was proved by a preponderance of the evidence 
discussed above. 
7. The amount of damages proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence was $3 3,3 07.66. 
8. There was insufficient evidence to show the loss of value 
of the Hercules' stock, or to show that Hercules or its agent 
caused the charging party to lose money on the stock. 
9. There is no statutory authority allowing the Commission to 
award any interest on damages under the Utah Antidiscrimination 
Act. 
10. The charging party was terminated in violation of U.C.A. 
Section 34-35-6 (1989). 
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ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Hercules reinstate the charging 
party to a position with salary and benefits commensurate to that 
which the charging party would have had if he had not been 
terminated from, employment. U. C. A. Section 34-3 5-7 1 (9) (1 9 91 ) .  
I T I S F U R T H E R 0 R D E R E D T H A T Hercules pay the charging party 
back pay of $33,3 07.66, and pay his attorney's fees and costs of 
$9,345. I J.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) (1991). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Hercules cease any discriminatory 
or prohibited employment practice against those who are 4 0 years 
old and older in violation of U.C.A. Section 34-35-6 (1989). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (3 0) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the 
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written 
response with the Commission iiI accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
Dated this / J day of / - <—~^>~
 f 1995. 
INDUSTRIAI . COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Benj^ainin A. Sims 
Adirfinistrative Law Judge 
..'NnVniuMETZ 
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MAILING of Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
I certify that I have mailed the attached docui.ient in the 
case of LOEL D THOMETZ, Case No. 8930254, to the following parties fcy 
first class prepaid postage on the |^ > day of Mar 95-
BRENT SHIMADA, Atty, 
HERCULES INCORPORATED BACCHUS WORKS 
MAGNA UT 84044 
KENNETH B GRIMES, JR, Atty, 
343 S 4TH E 
SLC UT 84111 
IcClain Nlcole^lc 
EXHIBIT 1 <>o7l^S 
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EXHIBIT I 
^ HERCULES 
Aerospace Company 
Interoffice Memo 
c c : R. Schwartz - 8414 NE 
T. V. McCarthy - 2123 NW 
R. R. Currie, J r . - 2175 NW 
B. E. Zepke - S3"5? "'SE 
D. R. Tabinowski - 11157 NW 
Wilminaton, Delaware 
Apr i l 20, 1990 
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D. 
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Hixon/Mr. H. A. Spatz - ABL 
Novak/Mr. R. A. Weber - Bacchus 
G  Martin/Mr. J . 0. Mack I I I . - Clearfield 
aol i l lo /Mr. R. 0. Savoy - Clearwater 
Marks/Mr. T. E. Babbony - Hatfield 
artin/Mr. FL P. Hedeman - Kenvil 
Graesser/Mr. J . T. Ferauson - McGregor 
Hurley/Mr. C. R. Lee -^Radford 
Heller/Mr. A. L. Meadows - Sunflower 
Forsythe/Mr, R. L. Frank - Simmonds/Norwich-Chester 
VanKoevering/Mr. W. E. Kenerson - Simmonds/Vergennes 
Samuelsen/Mr. S. J. Ness - Simmonds/Cedar Knolls 
Bossle/Mr. G. H. Van Arsdale - Simmonds/Ft. Lauderdale 
CD 
CD 
CD 
\D 
FROM: L. J , D iG iovann i - 11343 SE 
REDUCTION IN FORCE POLICY 
Hercules Incorporated has recen t ly adopted a Reduction-In-Force 
Policy which covers a l l sa la r ied employees a t . a l l Hercules l o c a t i o n s . In 
addi t ion , the corporation has created a Policy Compliance Committee (PCC) 
which has the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of assuring t h a t the specif ic p r a c t i c e s and 
procedures used to iden t i fy and s e l e c t persons for separation are in 
compliance with corporate policy and a l l appl icable laws and regu la t ions 
inc luding , but not l imi ted to , EZO, ADEA, ERISA, COBRA, e t c . 
Effective immediately, a l l reduct ions- in- force must be approved by 
the PCC pr ior to the implementation of the RIF. 
Attached i s a copy of the Reduction-In-Force Policy. Also a t t 
ulank and completed sample of the Personnel Displacement L i s t fo 
ched 
rm i s a bl ~ _ ^ _ ^...w-w w. w..w . . w_ , . 
which i s to be used and the information which i s to be gathered on employees 
who w i l l be part of any r educ t ion - in - fo rce . Please note t h a t when u t i l i z i n g 
the form exempts should be separated from nonexempts, and rankings should be 
completed by job, funct ion, or department - whichever makes t h e most sense. 
If you have any quest ions, p lease do not hes i t a t e to contac t 
Bob Currie at 302/594-7089 or me a t 302/594-5921. 
LJD/edg J / 
At tachment^^^L^ j EXHIBIT 1 V^SQP. 
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THE POLICY COMPLIANCE COMMUTE: 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
To assure retention of the best workforce, the criteri 
for se 1 ect i on of those individuals t o h e disci seed w i 1 
he in this order of priority: 
a . J o b p e r f o r m a n c e ; 
b . P r i o r e x p e r i e n c e , i n c l u d i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
. v e r s a t i l i t y and f l e x i b i l i t y i n t e r r a s o f known and 
d e m o n s t r a t e d p e r f o r m a n c e a n o t h - - r f v n c t i o n a i 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ; 
c .,. E d u c H t i o i: i a o o 1 i c a b 1 e t • D t: h e i o b ; 
e . P h y s i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s t o p e r f o r m i n g a f u n c t i o n o t h e r 
t h a n t h a t o n w h i c h c u r r e n t l y a s s i g n e d ( s u p p o r t e d by 
m e d i c a l d o c u m e n t a t i o n ) ; 
f. A d j u s t e d s e r v i c e d a t e / t h e n c o n t i n u o u s s e r v i c e ; 
if ai i of t h e above a r e eoua 1 __ 
g . D a t e of B i r t h ( r e t e n t i o n p r e f e r e n c e s h a l l be g r a n t e e 
t o t h e s e n i o r aged e m p l o y e e ) . 
The p r o c e s s s t a r t s . w i t h t h e B u s i n e s s Group o r Uni t 
d e s i g n i n g t h e new o r g a n i z a t i o n w h i c h w i l l i n d i c a t e t h e 
c h a n g e s and. r e d u c t i o n s an t h e new o r g a n i z a t i o n c h a r t . 
F o l l o w i n g a p p r o v a l of t h e new o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e , 
t h e U n i t E x e c u t i v e w i l l s c h e d u l e a m e e t i n g w i t h t h e 
P o l i c y Compl iance C o m m i t t e e (PCC) to s e e k a n o r o v a l of 
t h e s e p a r a t i o n and d i s p l a c e m e n t r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . 
At t h i s m e e t i n g , t h e U n i t E x e c u t i v e w i l l p r o v i d e ^3fe PCC 
w i t h : " CD 
•CD 
cn 
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a. Copies of the current organization chart idantifvinc 
those positions to be eliminated, transferred or" 
combined- These charrs will also identify the 
current incumbents cor each position. 
b. Copies of the new, approved organization chart 
identifying the recommended candidates for each 
O Q S it ion. 
c. A listing identifying each person selected for 
separation from the existing organization. The 
listing shall include the following information for 
each individual identified: 
1. Name and Title, (listed in salary grade order -
highest first) 
2. -Date of Employment and Adjusted Service Date 
CD 
2. Date of Birth and Age (in 1990) CD 
CD 
4 . Performance evaluation ranking or code ^r* 
5. Education 
6. Recommended action 
d. In addition to the above, the work history and 
performance appraisal records far each employee are 
to be available for review by the ?CC. 
III. The Unit Executive will present to the ?CC, the basis an' 
which, the retention ar separation recommendations have 
been made for each individual so identified: 
a. The rationale for 'keeping MA~ but not "5" must be 
'discussed - including why "B" cannct be demoted 
and/or transferred to another position; 
b. Ace is not a factor in the selection process. 
However, in the evenr that ail ocher criteria^are 
equal (including the same continuous service d^re), _ 
the mora senior aged employee would be retained; ana, 
c- Potential is never a factor in these displacement: 
decisions. 
cn 
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CD 
Pace—5 
Following presentation of recommendations }y. 
Executive '. 
,: cr-J 
f the PCC cDarove: tne cooroprute action, is to be 
initiated by the unit Executive in keeoinc with the 
The Unit Executive shall noi 
cnese cimeranies without approval of the PCC; 
established timetables 
alter r h P s Pt ri 
coes nor. approve any o" :ne 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , t h e U n i t e x e c u t i v e w i l l be r e q u i r e d 
t o d e v e l o p new a l t e r n a t i v e s a n d / o r o r o v i d e a d d i t i o n a l 
Lets to s u o p o r ' ihe - o r i o i n a l o r o o o s ; :?.G Silc 
tne arrecoec 
their imoendinc 
resubmit these data at a scheduled PCC meeting; 
Following PCC approval - and - a r t e 
individuals have been notified of " 
separation and/Gr displacement, the Human Resources 
Department may circulate a listing identifying these 
individuals to other Departments to determine if an 
appccpriate posit ion is available for which they may 
be qualified and could become candidates; and, 
Decisions of the PCC are final and cannot be 
overruled by. the Unit Executive, but may be appealed 
as provided for in the aooeal process. 
! L if :l ! p e :E ! p r o c e s s ] s a s i: a i i. o w s : 
The U n i t E x e c u t i v e w i l l a d v i s e t h e A p p e a l Board of 
t h e i n t e n t t o a p p e a l t h e PCC d e c i s i o n a n d r e q u e s t a 
m e e t i n g t o : 
1- P r e s e n t " t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s and f a c t s i n v o l v e d i n 
t he p r o p o s e d a c t i o n s as s u b m i t t e d . :he PCC, a n a , 
2 , E x p l a i n i t s o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e PCC r u l i n g and t h e ^  
r e a s o n s f o r r e c u e s t i n g a d e v i a t z . c n from cnar r u n n c ; 
The FCC C h a i r p e r s o n s h a l l p r e s e n t t h e - r a ! 
making i t s d e c i s i o n , i n c l u d i n g any a l t e r n a t i v e s 
recommended; 
F o l l o w i n g p r e s e n t a t i o n s by b a t h p a r t i e s , ^.h& Appea_ ^ 
E a a r d s h a l l r e n d e r i t s d e c i s i o n and s o a d v i s e t h e U n i ^ 
Exiecut ive and t h e PCC C h a i r p e r s o n . Th e Appeal n o a r n 
d e c i s i o n i s f i n a l -
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